









Theories on contextual behavior (e.g., social norm, self-identity, and legitimacy theories) 
suggest that the religiosity of the geographical area in which an organization operates 
influences its behavior. Using a sample of 91,020 VC investments in the U.S., we study 
whether religiosity influences VC investment decisions. Based on prior literature that finds a 
positive relation between religiosity and risk aversion, we posit that VCs located in more 
religious counties make less risky investments. We find that VCs located in more religious 
areas are more likely to be involved in staging and syndication and have a greater propensity 
to invest in later and expansion stages of portfolio companies. Taken together, our results 
suggest that VCs located in religious counties tend to be more risk averse. 
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Venture capitalists (VCs) are financial intermediaries that combine technological 
competence with financial skills to provide financial and management support to startup firms 
(Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Gompers and Lerner, 1999; Manigart et al., 2002; Sahlman, 
1990; Sapienza et al., 1996; Wright and Lockett, 2003; Andrieu and Groh; 2018).  
The VC industry has grown dramatically over the past three decades. From 1980 to 
1990, VC investments in the U.S. increased from USD $610 million to $2.3 billion (National 
Venture Capital Association, 2012). By 2010, total VC investment in the U.S. totaled 
approximately $30 billion. Moreover, revenue from formerly backed VC companies 
comprised 21% of U.S. GDP, and these firms employed 11% of the U.S. private sector 
workforce (National Venture Capital Association, 2012). By the third quarter of 2016, about 
$56 billion was invested across 6,000 companies in the U.S. (PitchBook-NVCA Venture 
Monitor, 2016). 
Nevertheless, VC investments tend to be high risk (Ewens and Rhodes-Kropf, 2015). 
Sahlman (2010) reports that 85% of VC returns come from 10% of investments, and, from 
1987-2012, only 12.8% of VC investments achieved an Initial Public Offering (IPO). The 
investment risk stems mainly from agency problems that can result from asymmetric 
information between VCs and entrepreneurs (Knight, 1921; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2004; 
Bertoni and Groh, 2014). Specifically, in VC investments, it is common for the VC to have 
relatively limited information about the growth potential of the firm. This is due to limited 
historical financial information, as well as the expensive and time-consuming process of 
gathering data to overcome any potential information deficits (Groh et al., 2010).  
It can be difficult for VCs to accurately gauge founding entrepreneurs’ ability to lead 
startups. This also increases the complexity of projecting future performance and investment 




Walz, 2005; Bertoni and Groh, 2014). The fact that entrepreneurs usually have more complete 
information than VCs leads to high adverse selection risk, which is typically borne by the VC 
(Cumming and Johan, 2008, 2013; Hain et al., 2016).  
Kaplan and Schoar (2005) report that, in contrast to other asset classes, such as mutual 
funds, VCs also tend to have persistent performance. Their success tends to be replicated in the 
next funds they manage. This ability of some VC funds to consistently produce top-performing 
investments suggests there is something unique and largely time-invariant about VC funds. In 
this paper, we examine whether one such factor is religiosity. 
To test our hypothesis, we use a comprehensive dataset of U.S. VC investments, 
consisting of 91,020 observations for the 1980-2014 period. Similarly to prior studies (e.g., 
Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000; Hilary and Hui, 2009; Dyreng et al., 2012; Adhikari and 
Agrawal, 2016a; Chircop et al., 2017), we source data on religiosity from the Association of 
Religion Data Archives (ARDA). We use the number of adherents and the number of 
denominations in the county in which the VC is headquartered as our two measures of 
religiosity.  
Given that risk-taking is unobservable, we use the propensity for a VC to be involved 
in the staging, syndication, and timing of VC investments as our three measures of risk taking. 
Prior literature has shown that staging mitigates agency problems, as more information about 
the startup is gathered over time, and the VC retains the option to abandon the project if it fails 
to meet strategic targets (e.g., Admati and Pfleiderer, 1994; Gompers, 1995; Kaplan and 
Strömberg, 2003, 2004; Wang and Zhou, 2004; Tian, 2011).  
Note that VC firms often seek other VC partners when investing in entrepreneurial 
companies. This process is referred to as syndication. It enables the VC firm to share 
investment risk with other VC firms while enjoying joint payoffs, because there may be an 




et al., 2016; Casamatta and Haritchabalet, 2007; Groh and von Liechtenstein, 2011; Hirsch and 
Walz, 2011). Finally, by investing in a startup at a later stage, the VC can effectively mitigate 
the problem of adverse selection, because it will have more information about the entrepreneur 
and the firm’s financial performance (Gompers, 1995; Wang and Zhou, 2004; Bienz and Walz, 
2010; Cumming and Johan, 2013; Bertoni et al., 2015). We find that VCs that are headquartered 
in more religious areas have a higher likelihood of being involved in staging, syndication, and 
of investing in startups at a later stage.  
We subject our results to a series of robustness tests. First, we check whether our results 
are driven by reverse causality, where more religious risk-averse entrepreneurs are seeking 
investments from religious VCs. Second, we include VC firm fixed effects to ensure that our 
observed results are not driven by cross-sectional variation in VC firms. Third, we conduct a 
series of falsification tests to ensure our results are not driven by portfolio firm religiosity. 
Fourth, we undertake tests to confirm that our results are not influenced by our econometric 
choices, such as the regression models used to run our main specification, or the way we 
calculate our religiosity measures. Fifth, we test whether our results are sensitive to VC 
investment strategy. Sixth, we check whether the observed results are driven by the clustering 
of VC activity in specific counties. Finally, to mitigate the possibility that our results are driven 
by an omitted variable that is correlated with both VC religiosity and VC investments, we 
examine how religiosity affects investments. To this end, we use the subsample of VC firms 
that changed counties during our sample period. Inferences from all of these tests suggest that 
our results are robust to the abovementioned specifications. 
In additional analyses, we find that the influence of religiosity on VC investment 
decisions varies cross-sectionally as a function of the agency conflict between the VC and the 
startup firm. We also find that VCs located in areas with more Protestants than Catholics tend 




Our contribution to the prior literature is twofold. First, we add to the literature on the 
influence of religiosity on investment decision making. The extant literature has shown that 
religiosity influences corporate investments (Hilary and Hui, 2009), innovation (Adhikari and 
Agrawal, 2016a), and mutual fund investments (Shu et al., 2012). In a similar vein, we also 
examine the effect of religiosity on investment decision making, but our setting is clearly 
different. Unlike companies or mutual funds, VCs tend to be lightly regulated and exposed to 
higher investment risk. They invest in startups, which generally have limited or no availability 
of historical data to project the future performance of the applied technology (Berger and 
Frame, 2007; Berger and Udell, 1998, 2002; Freel 1999, 2000, 2007). The lack of qualitative 
and quantitative information required to evaluate a startup exposes the VC to significant 
adverse selection risk.  
On the other hand, in contrast to companies or mutual funds, VCs can seek capital 
investments from sophisticated institutional or accredited investors. These professional 
investors are less likely to allow personal values to influence their investment decisions. Hence, 
it is ex ante unclear to what extent religiosity influences VC investment decisions.  
Second, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study the effect of the local 
environment on VC investment decisions. Some prior studies (e.g., Hilary and Hui, 2009; Shu 
et al., 2012) have shown that characteristics of the local environment can influence firm 
decisions. However, no study has yet examined the effect of characteristics of the local 
environment on VC investment decisions. This is somewhat surprising, given that the paucity 
of historical information about startups can increase the subjectivity of the VC investment 
decision making process.  
In this respect, Duffner et al. (2009) and Bottazzi et al. (2016) provide valuable 
empirical evidence on the importance of trust in venture capital investing. Specifically, they 




post basis for efficient and effective communication between the VC and the entrepreneur. 
Various studies have documented the relation between religiosity and trust (e.g., Hain et al., 
2016; Chuah et al., 2016). However, no study has yet examined the relation between the 
religiosity of the geographic area in which the VC operates and its investment decision making. 
This study fills this void. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we briefly review the 
prior literature and develop our hypothesis. In section 3, we establish our sample period, and 
describe our measures of VC risk taking and religiosity. Section 4 presents our main results, 
while section 5 shows the results for our robustness tests. In section 6, we discuss further 
analyses. Section 7 concludes.  
2. Hypothesis development 
In this study, we examine whether the religiosity of the geographic area in which a VC 
operates influences its investment decision making. Similarly, to Shu et al. (2012), we posit 
that: 1) VC religiosity influences decision making, and 2) VC religiosity is consistent with that 
of the geographical location in which it operates. 
With respect to the first premise, prior literature has shown that religiosity and religious 
affiliation influence occupational choice, organizational behavior, managerial decisions, and 
financial market behavior (Hilary and Hui, 2009; Kumar et al., 2011; Audretsch et al., 2013; 
Chircop et al., 2017). These effects stem from the link between individual religiosity and 
individuals’ own levels of risk aversion (Miller and Hoffmann, 1995; Barsky et al., 1997; 
Iannaccone, 1998; Lehrer, 2004; Benjamin et al., 2016; Liu, 2010; Dohmen et al., 2011; 
Noussair et al., 2013; Audretsch et al., 2013). Specifically, Malinowski (1925) and Miller and 
Hoffmann (1995) suggest that risk-averse people manage losses and fear through participation 
in religion, while Hilary and Hui (2009) suggest that more anxious individuals are likely to 




The effect of religiosity on economic decision making has been studied in numerous 
settings. For example, religiosity has been shown to influence the decision to pursue 
entrepreneurial activities (Audretsch et al., 2013), corporate investments (Hilary and Hui, 
2009), the use of option grants (Kumar et al., 2011), the incidence of accounting irregularities 
(McGuire et al., 2011), the propensity to undertake earnings management (Grullon et al., 2009; 
Dyreng et al., 2012), the propensity to undertake tax avoidance activities (Boone et al., 2012), 
patent innovations (Adhikari and Agrawal, 2016a), bank risk taking (Adhikari and Agrawal, 
2016b; Chircop et al., 2017), and mutual fund risk taking (Shu et al., 2012).  
Furthermore, religiosity may influence decision making through its effect on trust. In 
an experimental study, Chuah et al. (2016, p. 295) find evidence “that religion operates 
indirectly through social identities and religious affiliation which are used as a basis for 
discrimination in trust games.” For mutual funds and corporate investments, trust may be less 
important, because objective information about prospective investments is usually readily 
available. However, for VC investments, trust is of paramount importance (Hain et al., 2016). 
In contrast to other types of investing, VCs invest in startups, where historical information 
about the applied technology and the firm itself can be limited. Trust may partly fill this lacuna 
in available information.  
Bottazzi et al. (2016) distinguish between two types of trust: personalized and 
generalized. Personalized trust develops as a consequence of repeat interactions between two 
persons and can be regarded as the set of beliefs a person holds about the behavior of another 
person. Conversely, generalized trust can be thought of as the beliefs an individual has about a 
random group of identifiable individuals. The distinction between the two is particularly 
relevant in the context of VC investment decisions. When making an initial investment decision 




by generalized trust. Once the initial investment has taken place, and the VC has repeatedly 
interacted with the entrepreneur, personalized trust develops.  
The second premise underlying our investigation is that VC religiosity is consistent 
with that of the geographical location in which it operates. This assertion is based on theories 
related to contextual behavior. For example, social norm theory suggests that the religious 
norms of the environment in which the VC operates influence the VC regardless of whether 
the VC partners are themselves religious. This is because the norms of the local environment 
are an important component of the society within which the VC partners live and operate 
(Kohlberg, 1984; Sunstein, 1996; Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004; McGuire et al., 2011).  
Moreover, social identity theory (e.g., Tajfel, 1978; Hogg and Abrams, 1988) suggests 
that individuals are influenced by the local environment in which they operate through social 
interactions, in which people share their identities with each other. In this ambit, Schneider 
(1987) and Hilary and Hui (2009) argue that people are attracted to situations where they think 
they will fit in. Olson and Perl (2011) and Lim (2013, p. 396) find that “the religious 
composition of local areas predicts the religious composition of one’s intimate friendship 
network.” 
Finally, legitimacy theory suggests that firms need to establish congruence between the 
social norms implied by organizational activities, and the norms of the environment in which 
the firm is established. Legitimacy gaps, emanating from conflicts between the two sets of 
norms, may result in stakeholders withholding resources from the firm, thus hampering its 
operations (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Chircop et al., 2017).   
On the other hand, the lack of regulatory oversight over VC investments and heightened 
financial incentives may moderate the influence of religiosity on risk taking behavior (Jia and 
Wang, 2017). Unlike other collective investment vehicles, such as listed companies and mutual 




individuals, collectively known as sophisticated investors. VCs tend to be lightly regulated, 
and therefore there is no definitive investment mandate (or, rather, risk profile) that VCs must 
adhere to other than what is agreed upon between the investors and managing partners 
(Cumming and Johan, 2008). Furthermore, compared to other financial intermediaries, VCs 
have significant financial incentives, because they are typically paid a portion of the excess 
returns (Cumming and Johan, 2008, 2013; Jia and Wang, 2017).  
The flexibility in making investment decisions, together with the ability to take 
concentrated risks, likely motivates VCs to focus on profit-maximizing investment decisions. 
Thus, the influence of religiosity on VC investment decisions may be minimal.  
Note that many VC firms operate from several locations, often spread out across 
different counties. Most VCs empower the investment professionals located in these offices to 
carry out deal identification and due diligence, but the decision to invest is still made by the 
committee of managing partners that operates from the VC headquarters. If VC investment 
decision making is made in locations outside the headquarters, and if the VC partners located 
at headquarters have limited influence, then headquarters religiosity is unlikely to impact VC 
decision making.  
Finally, given that VC partners tend to be professionals who invest significant personal 
wealth in their own funds (Cumming and Johan, 2006; Jia and Wang, 2017), it remains unclear 
whether they allow their religious beliefs to influence their financial judgments.  
In summary, prior literature linking religiosity to risk aversion and theories related to 
contextual behavior suggest that VCs headquartered in areas that are more religious are more 
risk averse in their decision making. In contrast, the nature of VC firms may moderate any 
possible relationship between religiosity and VC investment decisions. Hence, it is an empirical 
question whether the negative relationship between religiosity and risk taking observed in the 




3. Data and variables 
3.1. Sample selection 
Our dataset merges several databases. We extract data for completed investment deals, 
where both the VC firm and the company are located in the U.S., from VentureXpert Thomson 
Financial. We exclude investments where dollar total investment, number of investors, number 
of rounds, and information on the first round of investment is missing. Data for county 
characteristics comes from Woods & Poole Economics, while data on religiosity comes from 
the Association of Religion Data Archives’ (ARDA)1 decennial surveys. Our final sample 
contains 91,020 VC firm investment observations for the 1980-2014 period.2 
In Table 1, we present the sample distribution by year. The number of VC investments 
increases steadily until 2000, when it stands at 7,029; it then drops after the so-called “dotcom” 
bubble bursts. The number rises again in the years prior to the recent financial crisis, until, in 
2008, it stands at 5,055. After the financial crisis, the number drops again rather precipitously, 
and in 2014, the last year of our sample, we have 2,048 VC investment transactions. Average 
total funds invested per transaction by VC firms in a portfolio company per year are $41,403 
(column (3) of Table 1), and the average deal had 25 investors (column (4) of Table 1) and 6 
financing rounds (column (5) of Table 1). Furthermore, 84% of investment rounds on average 
involved syndicates (column (6) of Table 1).  
[Table 1 here] 
3.2. Religiosity and control variables 
Our measure of religiosity comes from ARDA’s decennial surveys.3 The dataset 
provides information on the number of recognized religious denominations, and the number of 
 
1 This data is publicly available at http://www.theARDA.com. 
2 Our sample is comparable to that in other studies, such as, e.g., Nahata (2008). 
3 We recognize that these surveys suffer from self-selection bias, since religious denominations self-select to 
participate in these surveys. However, the alternative surveys by Gallup suffer from the same problem, as 




adherents to these denominations in each county. We source our data from the ARDA surveys 
undertaken in 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010. In contrast to other studies (e.g., Alesina and La 
Ferrara, 2000; Hilary and Hui, 2009; Dyreng et al., 2012; Adhikari and Agrawal, 2016a, 2016b; 
Gao et al., 2017), we obtain data for missing years through linear interpolation. This increases 
the power of our tests but assumes a linear change in our variables over time.  
We compute two measures of religiosity. The first, ADHERENTS, follows prior 
literature (e.g., Hilary and Hui, 2009; Gao et al., 2017), and is computed as the total number of 
adherents to any recognized religious denomination, scaled by the population of the county. 
The second, DENOMINATIONS, is the number of recognized denominations per 1,000 
population in each county. The Pearson correlation between these two measures is around 16%, 
and suggests they capture different dimensions of religiosity. Specifically, the first measure 
captures the quantity of people in each county that follow a religion, while the second measure 
captures the variety of religious denominations in a county.  
3.3. VC firm investment risk measures 
 We construct three distinct measures of VC investment risk. To this end, we rely on 
prior literature regarding established risk-mitigating measures used by VCs in their investments 
(e.g., Admati and Pfleiderer, 1994; Gompers, 1995; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003; Wright and 
Lockett, 2003; Wang and Zhou, 2004; Manigart et al., 2006; Casamatta and Haritchabalet, 
2007; Tian, 2011; Cumming and Johan, 2008, 2013; Bertoni et al., 2015; Hain et al., 2016). 
The first measure captures the degree to which a VC firm is involved in staging, the process 
whereby the VC firm divides its total committed financing to the portfolio company into 
several financing rounds. Staging is an important instrument for controlling for investment risk, 
because the VC firm retains the option to pursue or abandon further investment in a company. 
To capture VC involvement in staging, we construct a variable, NUMBER OF ROUNDS, that 




Our second measure of firm investment risk captures the degree to which the VC is 
involved in syndication, which refers to the cooperation of several VC firms in financing a 
deal. Syndication allows a VC firm to share investment risk among many firms. Thus, our 
second measure, NUMBER OF INVESTORS, captures the number of investors in the company. 
VC firms also decide in what stage of company development they will invest. Seed and early-
stage investments pose a greater risk than investments in later and expansion stages. We, 
therefore, create a third measure of risk, LATER OR EXPANSION, that captures whether VC 
funding is at the later or expansion stage of company development.  
3.4. Control variables  
As in previous studies (e.g., Bottazzi et al., 2016),4 we control for VC firm, portfolio 
company, and county characteristics in our model. In particular, we control for deal 
characteristics that are measured at the level of VC firm and portfolio company pairs, such as 
whether the VC firm is an independent private equity firm, its size, and age.5 Furthermore, we 
include controls for the industry in which the company operates, and for whether the company 
is seeking seed or early-stage financing. We also control for demographic characteristics at the 
county level, such as population size, age, employment, and education. We also include 
variables to proxy for economic conditions such as income and gross regional product at the 
county level. Finally, we include company, county, and year fixed effects. We provide more 
details on the variables in Appendix Table AI. 
3.5. Summary statistics 
Table 2 shows the summary statistics for our sample period, 1980 2014. Mean 
ADHERENTS is 0.48, suggesting that, on average, 48% of each county’s population adheres to 
 
4 Note that Bottazzi et al.’s (2016) research methodology allows them to control for certain VC and company 
characteristics for which we do not have readily available data. 
5 VC size and age indirectly control for VC partner ability, because larger and older VC firms are more likely to 




a religious denomination. Mean DENOMINATIONS is 0.57, suggesting, on average, there is 
one religious denomination per 2,000 people in a county.  
The average age of VC firms in our sample is 27 [= exp(3.33)], and 83% of them are 
independent firms. Approximately 70% of the portfolio companies are information technology 
firms, while 19% are medical firms. Only 11% of portfolio companies received their first 
financing at the seed stage, and over 26% received it at an early stage. Average distance 
between VC firm and portfolio company is 40 miles [= exp(2.69)].  
In terms of demographic controls, the mean population of the county in which the firm 
and company are headquartered is 953 [= exp(6.86)] thousand and 1,187 [= exp(7.08)] 
thousand, respectively. Average population age in VC firm and portfolio company counties is 
36 [= exp(3.57)] and 35 [= exp(3.55)] years, respectively, while average population in 
employment is 671 [= exp(6.51)] thousand in the firm’s county, and 820 [= exp(6.71)] thousand 
in the company’s county. Average annual income is $50,000 (in 2009 dollars). The gross 
regional product (GRP) of the VC firm and company county is $67,507 [= exp(11.12)] million 
and $81,634 [= exp(11.31)] million in 2009 dollars, respectively.  
[Table 2 here] 
4. Results 
This section presents our main findings for the relationship between religiosity and VC 
investment characteristics. We proxy for VC firm risk-taking behavior using the three VC 
investment measures: 1) “staging,” the number of financing rounds in which the VC 
participates, 2) “syndication,” the number of participants in each financing round, and 3) the 
stage of company development at which the VC investment takes place.  
We test for the influence of religiosity on VC risk taking using the specification 
expressed in Eq. (1): 




where RISK_TAKING is one of our three measures of risk taking: NUMBER OF ROUNDS, 
NUMBER OF INVESTORS, and LATER OR EXPANSION. We define the dependent variables, 
NUMBER OF ROUNDS and NUMBER OF INVESTORS, as the natural log of 1 plus the 
number of financing rounds and the natural log of 1 plus the number of investors, respectively, 
in order to estimate Eq. (1) as an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression.6 LATER OR 
EXPANSION is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the VC investment takes place in a later 
or expansion phase of the firm, and 0 otherwise. We run Eq. (1) as a linear probability 
regression when LATER OR EXPANSION is the dependent variable.7 RELIGIOSITY is either 
ADHERENTS or DENOMINATIONS. We include the controls discussed earlier, county and 
year fixed effects.  
Panel A of Table 3 reports the results when ADHERENTS is our measure of religiosity. 
We find that ADHERENTS is associated with reduced VC risk taking, as shown by the positive 
and significant association with our dependent variables. Specifically, the coefficient on 
ADHERENTS when the dependent variable is either NUMBER OF ROUNDS (coeff: 0.133 t-
stat: 1.74) or NUMBER OF INVESTORS (coeff: 0.210 t-stat: 1.65) is significant at the 10% 
level. It is significant at the 5% level when LATER OR EXPANSION (coeff: 0.133 t-stat: 2.30) 
is the dependent variable. The economic effects of these results suggest that a 1-standard 
deviation increase in ADHERENTS increases NUMBER OF ROUNDS by 0.013 and NUMBER 
OF INVESTORS by 0.021. These increases correspond to approximately 2.4% of the standard 
deviation of NUMBER OF ROUNDS and NUMBER OF INVESTORS. Similarly, a 1-standard 
deviation in ADHERENTS increases the propensity of investing in the LATER OR EXPANSION 
stages by 2.7%. 
 
6 As robustness tests, we performed a Poisson and a negative binomial regression when the number of rounds and 
the number of investors are unlogged. The inferences from these results are similar to those discussed in the paper. 
We present these analyses in the Online Appendix. 
7 As robustness tests, we performed a logit and a probit regression when LATER OR EXPANSION is the dependent 
variable. The inferences from these results are similar to those discussed in the paper. We present these analyses 




 Panel B of Table 3 reports the results when DENOMINATIONS is our measure of 
religiosity. Similarly, to the results for ADHERENTS, we find that DENOMINATIONS is 
positively associated with reduced VC risk taking, as shown by the positive and significant 
association between DENOMINATIONS and our three dependent variables. Specifically, 
DENOMINIATIONS is significantly associated with NUMBER OF ROUNDS (coeff: 0.101 t-
stat: 3.31) and NUMBER OF INVESTORS (coeff: 0.203 t-stat: 4.08) at the 1% level. 
DENOMINATIONS is significantly associated with LATER OR EXPANSION (coeff: 0.051 t-
stat: 2.17) at the 5% level. The economic effects of these results suggest that a 1-standard 
deviation increase in DENOMINATIONS increases NUMBER OF ROUNDS by 0.029 and 
NUMBER OF INVESTORS by 0.057. These increases correspond to approximately 5% of the 
standard deviation of NUMBER OF ROUNDS, and 6% of NUMBER OF INVESTORS. 
Similarly, a 1-standard deviation increase in DENOMINATIONS increases the propensity of 
investing in the LATER OR EXPANSION phase by 2.8%.8 
We find that the coefficients on the control variables are similar when either 
DENOMINATIONS or ADHERENTS is our measure of religiosity. VC experience and distance 
between the VC firm and company are associated with reduced VC risk taking, as shown by 
the significantly positive coefficient on VC_AGE and DISTANCE for all dependent variables. 
Moreover, when a company hails from a risky industry, such as information technology (C_IT) 
or medical (C_MEDICAL), it tends to engage in a larger number of financing rounds and to 
have a larger number of investors. Conversely, when a company has previously secured seed 
(SEED_STAGE) or early-stage (EARLY_STAGE) capital, and hence may be less risky, it tends 
to engage in a smaller number of financing rounds and to have fewer investors.  
 [Table 3 here]  
5. Robustness tests 
 




5.1. Instrumental variable analysis 
Thus far, we have documented a significant and positive relation between local 
religious beliefs and reduced risk taking. While this relation is consistent with our conjecture 
that local religious beliefs lead to lower risk taking due to increased risk aversion, it 
nevertheless may be driven by endogeneity. For example, we may observe such a relationship 
due to reverse causality, i.e., if companies that are less risky tend to opt for investments from 
more religious VC. In order to mitigate this concern, we run an instrumental variable analysis. 
We use three-year lagged religiosity measures as the instrument in the first stage for all 
regressions (Hilary and Hui, 2009). We also use total county population lagged by three years, 
except for the number of rounds specifications, where we use the lagged three-year proportion 
of white population in a VC county. Such variables are stable over time, so historical values 
are correlated with the current religiosity measure (the relevance criterion). However, we do 
not expect three-year lagged values to have any effect on current VC firm risk taking other that 
through current religiosity (exclusion criterion). The use of instruments with a three-year lag 
is motivated by Cumming and Johan (2013), who show that the investment cycle for a VC has 
an average duration of three years from initial investment to exit.  
Table 4 presents the results from the second-stage regression. Panel A reports the 
estimated coefficients on the religiosity measures where the independent variable is NUMBER 
OF ROUNDS, panel B reports for NUMBER OF INVESTORS, and panel C for LATER OR 
EXPANSION. Consistent with our previous results, the second-stage regressions indicate that 
religiosity is associated with reduced VC risk taking, as shown by the positive and significant 
coefficients on the fitted values for religiosity when any of the risk taking variables are the 
dependent variables. The magnitudes of the estimated coefficients also remain similar to those 
in previous findings. The first-stage F-tests have p-values of 0.000 in all regressions, and the 




1.5), hence failing to reject the orthogonality condition. Taken together, these tests suggest that 
the instruments are adequate.  
 [Table 4 here] 
5.2. Including VC FEs 
 Note that, in Eq. (1), we include county fixed effects to control for time-invariant county 
characteristics that may be correlated with religiosity, and year fixed effects to control for time 
trends in religiosity. However, the observed relation between religiosity and risk taking may 
be driven by cross-sectional variation in VC firms. Specifically, VC risk taking may be driven 
by VC firm characteristics other than religiosity, but which may be still correlated with 
religiosity. To address this possibility, we introduce VC firm fixed effects in Eq. (1). 
 Table 5 shows the results. Panel A reports the results with ADHERENTS as our measure 
of religiosity, and panel B with DENOMINATIONS as our measure of religiosity. When we use 
either ADHERENTS or DENOMINATIONS, we find a positive association between religiosity 
and our measures for risk taking. As expected, the magnitude of the coefficients is marginally 
smaller than for our main analysis, but the relation is statistically significant for most 
specifications. The relation between ADHERENTS and NUMBER OF INVESTORS (coeff.: 
0.296 t-stat.: 1.67) is significant at the 10% level. Similarly, the relation between 
DENOMINATIONS and NUMBER OF ROUNDS (coeff.: 0.088 t-stat: 1.69) or NUMBER OF 
INVESTORS (coeff. :0.149 t-stat.:1.77) is significant at the 10% level. The relation between 
DENOMINATIONS and LATER OR EXPANSION (coeff. :0.119 t-stat.:2.94) is significant at 
the 1% level. 
[Table 5 here] 
5.3. Falsification tests  
 Given that our story relates to the effect of VC religiosity on VC risk taking, we must 




need to ensure that, in line with our predictions, it is the religiosity of the VC that drives the 
observed results, not the religiosity of the entrepreneur.  
To test this notion, we conduct a falsification test, where we substitute the religiosity 
of the VC firm in Eq. (1) with the religiosity of the portfolio firm. Importantly, in this analysis, 
we also include VC firm fixed effects to control for time-invariant VC characteristics that may 
be related to its investments. In so doing, we are essentially examining the effect of variation 
in portfolio firm religiosity for a VC firm on that firm’s level of risk taking. If the religiosity 
of the VC firm is driving our results, we expect to find no significant association between 
portfolio firm religiosity and VC risk taking. 
 Panels A and B of Table 6 show the results. In panel A, religiosity of the portfolio firm 
is captured by the number of adherents (PORTFOLIO COMPANY ADHERENTS); in panel B, 
religiosity of the investee firm is captured by denominations (PORTFOLIO COMPANY 
DENOMINATIONS). In both panels, the coefficient on portfolio company religiosity is 
negative but insignificant for all measures of VC risk taking. This result bolsters our story that 
the religiosity of the VC influences VC risk taking, not portfolio company religiosity. 
 Another possibility is that our main results may be driven by the ability of VC firms 
and entrepreneurs of similar religious denominations to communicate better and hence mitigate 
information asymmetries. In other words, it is possible that similarities in religiosity between 
the VC and the portfolio firm drive our results. If this alternative explanation holds, we would 
expect investments in portfolio firms located in the same county as the VC firms (i.e., where 
the portfolio and VC firms have similar religiosity levels) to be incrementally related to VC 
risk taking, versus investments in firms located in a different county.  
To test this notion, we create an indicator variable, SAME COUNTY, that equals 1 if the 
VC and the portfolio firm are located in the same county, and 0 otherwise. Importantly we run 




located in the same county as the VC with those located in a different county for the same VC 
firm. If the alternative explanation drives VC risk taking, we should observe a statistically 
significant relation between SAME COUNTY and our measures for VC risk taking. 
 Panel C of Table 6 shows the results. For our three measures of risk taking, the 
coefficient on SAME COUNTY is insignificant, suggesting that the similarity in religiosity 
between the VC firm and the portfolio firm does not drive our results. It is pertinent to note 
that this result does not suggest information asymmetry does not affect VC decision making. 
In fact, the control for it in our main analysis, DISTANCE, is positive and significant in all of 
our specifications. This suggests that greater information asymmetry between the VC and 
portfolio firms is associated with an increased number of rounds and number of investors, as 
well as investments in the later or expansion stage. The insignificant result in panel C of Table 
6 merely suggests that similarity in religion between the VC and the portfolio firm is not 
associated with VC risk taking. This result further strengthens our hypothesis that VC 
religiosity influences VC risk taking. 
[Table 6 here] 
5.4. Other robustness tests 
 We conduct additional tests to confirm the robustness of our results. For the sake of 
brevity, and to facilitate exposition, we discuss and present those results in greater detail in the 
Online Appendix.  
 First, we test whether our results are robust to different econometric choices. Given the 
discrete nature of the distribution of the NUMBER OF ROUNDS and NUMBER OF 
INVESTORS, we estimate Eq. (1) for these two measures of risk as a Poisson and a negative 
binomial (NB) model. In both regressions, we express the dependent variables in levels. 




hyperbolic sine transformation (Bellemare and Wichman, 2019) to NUMBER OF ROUNDS 
and NUMBER OF INVESTORS, instead of using the natural log transformation. 
Finally, to ensure that our result for LATER OR EXPANSION is not driven by the choice 
of econometric model, we test whether our results are robust if we estimate Eq. (1) as a probit 
or a logit regression. Results for these analyses are in Tables A-C of the Online Appendix. The 
inferences from these tests are in line with our main results, and suggest they are not sensitive 
to our econometric choices. 
 Second, we test whether our results are sensitive to the way we construct our religiosity 
measures. Following prior literature (e.g., Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000; Hilary and Hui, 2009; 
Dyreng et al., 2012; Adhikari and Agrawal, 2016a, 2016b; Gao et al., 2017), we use linear 
interpolation to fill religiosity data for years not covered by the ARDA decennial surveys. To 
ensure our results are not sensitive to interpolation, we run a robustness test where religiosity 
data for years with missing data is taken from the closest ARDA survey. The results are in 
Table D of the Online Appendix and are similar to our main results. They suggest our results 
are not sensitive to the way we calculate religiosity for years with missing data. 
Third, we test for the possibility that the specific investment strategy used by the VC 
firm is correlated with religiosity, and hence may bias our results. To test this notion, we follow 
Shu et al. (2012) and Gao et al. (2017) and interact year and strategy fixed effects. We define 
strategy as investments in specific industries: 1) information technology; 2) medical, health, or 
life science; or 3) non-high technology. The results are in Table E of the Online Appendix and 
suggest that VC strategy does not influence our main results. 
Fourth, to address the possibility that our results may be driven by VC activity clustered 
in a specific county, we re-run our main analysis, excluding each county one by one. We then 
use the coefficients on the remaining sample to plot coefficient distribution graphs. We report 




distribution graphs are narrow, suggesting that the observed relation between VC religiosity 
and VC risk taking is not driven by specific counties. 
Fifth, to mitigate the possibility that another omitted variable correlated with religiosity 
is driving our results, we examine how religiosity affects investments for the subsample of VC 
firms that changed counties during our sample period. Change in county represents a quasi-
exogenous shock to VC religiosity, because we do not expect VC firms to change the location 
of their headquarters simply because of differences in religiosity between two counties. If our 
prediction that VC religiosity is driving VC risk taking is correct, we expect a difference in 
religiosity between the two counties to be associated with our measures for VC risk taking.  
To have a cleaner setting, for this analysis, we only consider VCs that moved once 
during our sample period. We also distinguish between firms that moved to a less from those 
that move to a more religious county. If VC religiosity is driving our results, we expect an 
increase in risk aversion for firms that moved to a more religious county when compared to 
those VC firms that moved to a less religious county. 
The results are in Table F of the Online Appendix. We find that, after relocation, VCs 
that moved to a more religious county are more likely to be involved in staging and syndication 
than those that moved to a less religious county. Taken together, these results suggest that, in 
line with our prediction, relocating to a more religious county results in more risk-averse VC 
investments. 
6. Further analysis 
 In this section, we briefly discuss the motivation for further analyses of when the 
relation between religiosity and VC risk taking behavior is stronger. Similarly, to section 5.4., 
for the sake of brevity and to facilitate exposition, we discuss these analyses and their results 




 First, we test whether the effect of VC religiosity on VC risk taking is stronger when 
asymmetric information and the subsequent agency conflict is expected to be most pervasive. 
Specifically, we expect investments in information technology firms to signal high investment 
risk and high agency conflict. These firms typically 1) consist of the entrepreneur and a few 
key individuals with limited business experience, 2) have limited tangible assets, and 3) place 
an overly high value on the entrepreneur’s human capital. To test whether the effect of VC 
religiosity on VC risk taking is stronger under these conditions, we interact our measures of 
religiosity with C_IT, an indicator variable that equals 1 if the investee firm operates in the 
information technology sector, and 0 otherwise. 
 Table G of the Online Appendix reports the results. We find that the effect of religiosity 
on VC risk taking is stronger in the presence of greater information asymmetry and agency 
conflict. For both measures of religiosity, we find that the interaction term between religiosity 
and C_IT is positive and significant. These results confirm our prediction that, when VC firms 
invest in riskier industries, the effect of religiosity on VC investments is stronger. 
 Second, we examine whether the previously observed relation between religiosity and 
VC risk taking is sensitive to the specific religious denomination to which people adhere. The 
extant literature has found mixed evidence on the relation between specific religious 
denominations and risk taking. Barsky et al. (1997), Stulz and Williamson (2003), and 
Benjamin et al. (2016) find that Catholics tend to be more risk tolerant than Protestants, while 
Renneboog and Spaenjers (2012) and Baxamusa and Jalal (2016) find that Catholics tend to be 
more risk averse than Protestants. Given this inconclusive evidence, we examine whether the 
prevalent denomination in the county in which the VC is located influences VC risk taking. 
We substitute RELIGIOSITY in Eq. (1) with a new variable, PROTESTANTS TO CATHOLICS, 





 Table H of the Online Appendix presents the results. For the three measures of VC risk 
taking, we find that the coefficient on PROTESTANTS TO CATHOLICS is positive, albeit only 
significant for NUMBER OF ROUNDS and NUMBER OF INVESTORS. These results are 
consistent with Barsky et al. (1997), Stulz and Williamson (2003), and Benjamin et al., (2016). 
They and provide evidence that VCs located in counties with more Protestants than Catholics 
tend to be more risk averse in their investment decisions. 
7. Conclusion 
The lack of literature on how religiosity influences VC investment decision making is 
surprising, given that prior literature has shown it strongly influences corporate (Hilary and 
Hui, 2009) and mutual fund (Shu et al., 2012) investment decisions. However, VCs differ in 
that they are high risk investors exposed to significant investment risk. They are only lightly 
regulated and are allowed to seek capital from professional investors. It is therefore ex ante 
unclear what effect (if any) religiosity has on VC decision making.  
 To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to provide evidence about the 
relation between religiosity and VC investment decision making. Our results are consistent 
with the notion that religiosity is positively related to risk aversion, and, hence, VC firms 
located in more religious areas are more likely to be involved in staging, syndication, and 
investing in startups at a later stage. In further analyses, we find that the influence of religiosity 
on VC investments is stronger with greater agency costs, and with a greater adherence to 
Protestantism than to Catholicism. 
As with any other research, interpretation of our findings is subject to several caveats. 
First, since we cannot directly observe risk taking, we rely on measures that prior literature has 
shown are correlated with the magnitude of VC risk taking. Nevertheless, it is likely that these 
measures capture risk taking with errors. Second, the religiosity of the VC partners is 




of the geographic area in which the organization operates. While various theoretical and 
empirical studies have provided support for such a proxy, it is likely that we capture VC 











NUMBER OF ROUNDS Natural logarithm of 1 plus the number of rounds of financing provided 
to the company by VCs [VentureXpert, Thomson Financial] 
NUMBER OF INVESTORS Natural logarithm of 1 plus the number of investors in the company 
[VentureXpert, Thomson Financial] 
LATER OR EXPANSION Indicator variable that equals 1 if the first funding was at the later or 





ADHERENTS Total number of adherents to any recognized religious denomination, 
scaled by total population for the county. Data come from the ARDA 
decennial surveys. Observations for missing years are computed using 
interpolation [ARDA] 
DENOMINATIONS Total number of recognized religious denominations in a county per 1,000 
people in the county. Data come from the ARDA decennial surveys. 
Observations for missing years are computed using interpolation [ARDA] 
ADHERENTS_CLOSE Total adherents to any recognized religious denomination, scaled by total 
population for the county. Data come from the ARDA decennial surveys. 
Observations for missing years are deemed to be the same as those for the 
closest ARDA survey [ARDA] 
DENOMINATIONS_CLOSE Total number of recognized religious denominations in a county per 1,000 
people in the county. Data come from the ARDA decennial surveys. 
Observations for missing years are deemed to be the same as those for the 
closest ARDA survey [ARDA] 
PROTESTANTS TO 
CATHOLICS 
Number of adherents to the largest Protestant religious denominations, 
scaled by the sum of the number of adherents to the Roman Catholic 
religion and the number of adherents to the largest Protestant religious 
denominations. Data come from the ARDA decennial surveys. 




INDEPENDENT VC Indicator variable that equals 1 if the VC is an independent private equity 
firm, and 0 otherwise [VentureXpert, Thomson Financial] 
VC AGE Natural logarithm of 1 plus age of the VC firm [VentureXpert, Thomson 
Financial] 
C_IT Indicator variable that equals 1 if the company industry is information 
technology, and 0 otherwise [VentureXpert, Thomson Financial] 
C_MEDICAL Indicator variable that equals 1 if the company industry is medical, health, 
or life science, and 0 otherwise [VentureXpert, Thomson Financial] 
SEED_STAGE Indicator variable that equals 1 if the company raised seed finance, and 0 
otherwise [VentureXpert, Thomson Financial] 
EARLY_STAGE Indicator variable that equals 1 if the company raised early-stage finance, 
and 0 otherwise [VentureXpert, Thomson Financial] 
STRATEGY Indicator variable that equals 1 if the VC firm has investments in specific 
industries: 1) information technology; 2) medical, health, or life science; 





DISTANCE Natural logarithm of 1 plus distance in miles between the VC firm and 





F_POP/C_POP Firm (F) or company (C) natural logarithm of total population in a county: 
WP001 [Woods & Poole Economics] 
F_POP_AGE/C_POP_AGE Firm (F) or company (C) natural logarithm of median population age in a 
county: WP020 [Woods & Poole Economics] 
F_EMP/C_EMP Firm (F) or company (C) natural logarithm of total employment in a 
county: WP032 [Woods & Poole Economics] 
F_INC.C_INC Firm (F) or company (C) natural logarithm of total personal income per 
capita (2009 $) in a county: WP089 [Woods & Poole Economics] 
F_GRP/C_GRP Firm (F) or company (C) natural logarithm gross regional product in a 
county: WP092 [Woods & Poole Economics] 
F_EDU/C_EDU Firm (F) or company (C) natural logarithm of educational attainment in a 
county [United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research 
Service] 
F_FM/C_FM Firm (F) or company (C) ratio of male to female population in a county: 
WP030/WP031 [Woods & Poole Economics] 
F_DENSITY/C_ DENSITY Firm (F) or company (C) persons per household in a county: WP093 
[Woods & Poole Economics] 
F_HOUSE_INC/C_HOUSE_INC Firm (F) or company (C) natural logarithm of mean household income 
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This table shows sample distributions by year for the variables used in our base model. The sample includes all 
round-by-round VC investments in portfolio firms from 1980 through 2014. The sample size consists of 91,020 
observations. Column (2) shows the number of observations; column (3) shows the total invested in thousands by 
the VC firm in a portfolio company; column (4) shows the number of VC investors in the portfolio company; 
column (5) shows the number of financing rounds; and column (6) shows the percentage of rounds in each year 















1980 394 19,735 23 5 85% 
1981 659 15,832 27 6 88% 
1982 995 17,689 29 6 87% 
1983 1,536 22,545 33 6 91% 
1984 1,748 20,949 34 6 92% 
1985 1,460 19,805 34 7 91% 
1986 1,751 27,664 39 7 91% 
1987 1,695 27,661 34 7 88% 
1988 1,618 28,837 34 7 89% 
1989 1,578 33,323 33 7 88% 
1990 1,224 26,923 30 8 80% 
1991 1,077 29,699 30 8 79% 
1992 1,380 31,328 28 8 80% 
1993 1,040 31,354 28 8 78% 
1994 1,181 38,897 27 7 81% 
1995 1,530 36,342 22 6 75% 
1996 2,011 40,878 21 6 77% 
1997 2,737 43,565 22 6 82% 
1998 2,967 50,440 21 6 80% 
1999 5,009 60,456 21 5 86% 
2000 7,029 55,097 19 5 88% 
2001 4,059 56,612 22 6 85% 
2002 3,118 58,075 25 7 86% 
2003 3,235 62,507 26 7 86% 
2004 3,707 59,341 26 7 89% 
2005 3,853 58,263 25 7 88% 
2006 4,510 60,287 23 6 86% 
2007 5,020 55,633 22 6 86% 
2008 5,055 50,279 20 6 83% 
2009 3,592 56,102 20 6 79% 
2010 4,350 49,981 16 5 82% 
2011 4,432 47,990 14 4 84% 
2012 1,609 57,654 13 4 72% 
2013 1,813 48,303 13 4 75% 
2014 2,048 49,043 12 4 75% 







This table shows summary statistics for the variables used in our base model. The sample includes all round-by-round VC investments in portfolio firms from 1980 through 
2014. The sample size consists of 91,020 observations. All variables are as defined in Appendix Table AI. 
 Mean S.D. Min P25 Median P75 Max 
NUMBER OF ROUNDS 1.80 0.54 0.69 1.39 1.79 2.20 2.89 
NUMBER OF INVESTORS 2.83 0.88 0.69 2.30 2.94 3.47 4.52 
LATER OR_EXPANSION 0.56 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
ADHERENTS 0.48 0.10 0.31 0.42 0.44 0.56 0.74 
DENOMINATIONS 0.57 0.28 0.35 0.43 0.49 0.60 2.37 
PROTESTANTS TO CATHOLICS 0.14 0.17 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.12 0.89 
VC_INDEPENDENT 0.83 0.37 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
VC_AGE 3.33 0.43 2.08 3.04 3.40 3.64 4.06 
C_IT 0.70 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
C_MEDICAL 0.19 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
SEED_STAGE 0.11 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
EARLY_STAGE 0.26 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
DISTANCE 2.69 2.12 0.00 0.00 3.49 4.06 6.48 
F_POP 6.86 0.93 2.84 6.54 6.65 7.37 9.19 
C_POP 7.08 0.75 4.76 6.60 7.26 7.42 9.19 
F_POP_AGE 3.57 0.08 3.38 3.51 3.57 3.63 3.73 
C_POP_AGE 3.55 0.08 3.37 3.50 3.56 3.61 3.72 
F_EMP 6.51 0.99 2.04 6.14 6.52 7.02 8.62 
C_EMP 6.71 0.79 4.16 6.21 6.82 7.06 8.64 
F_INC 10.84 0.32 10.10 10.61 10.86 11.10 11.75 
C_INC 10.81 0.32 10.16 10.57 10.79 11.02 11.76 
F_GRP 11.12 1.12 6.04 10.78 11.11 11.76 13.20 
C_GRP 11.31 0.93 8.25 10.91 11.41 11.91 13.20 
F_EDU 15.91 5.39 6.10 12.46 14.95 18.02 30.68 
C_EDU 15.66 4.93 6.00 12.52 15.24 18.25 30.10 
F_FM 1.03 0.04 0.96 0.99 1.03 1.05 1.13 
C_FM 1.02 0.04 0.96 0.99 1.02 1.05 1.13 
F_DENSITY 2.59 0.24 1.98 2.40 2.66 2.75 2.98 
C_DENSITY 2.62 0.24 1.98 2.44 2.68 2.83 2.99 
F_HOUSE_INC 11.79 0.33 11.02 11.56 11.80 12.06 12.44 





Religiosity and VC Investment Characteristics 
This table presents OLS regression analyses of religiosity on the number of rounds in column (1), the number of 
investors in column (2), and on the stage of company development in column (3). Panel A measures religiosity 
using ADHERENTS, and Panel B using DENOMINATIONS. All regressions include constant, deal, and company 
county characteristics and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by VC firm. The sample includes all 
round-by-round VC investments in portfolio firms from 1980 through 2014. The sample size consists of 91,020 
observations. All variables are as defined in Appendix Table AI. ***, **, and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% 
significance levels, respectively.  
Panel A. ADHERENTS 
 
(1) 








 Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat 
ADHERENTS 0.133* (1.74) 0.210* (1.65) 0.133** (2.30) 
VC_INDEPENDENT 0.053*** (4.99) 0.046** (2.41) -0.023** (-2.24) 
VC_AGE 0.088*** (6.61) 0.104*** (5.55) 0.050*** (4.89) 
C_IT 0.111*** (9.61) 0.281*** (16.31) 0.027*** (3.51) 
C_MEDICAL 0.248*** (18.67) 0.521*** (25.53) -0.070*** (-7.74) 
SEED_STAGE -0.311*** (-35.96) -0.497*** (-37.25)   
EARLY_STAGE -0.258*** (-46.92) -0.400*** (-48.50)   
DISTANCE 0.016*** (3.62) 0.034*** (5.24) 0.016*** (4.90) 
F_POP -0.051 (-0.92) 0.020 (0.20) -0.072 (-1.61) 
C_POP 0.078 (0.70) -0.344* (-1.79) 0.080 (0.82) 
F_POP_AGE 0.073 (0.58) 0.172 (0.82) -0.015 (-0.14) 
C_POP_AGE -0.577** (-2.18) -2.046*** (-4.90) -0.012 (-0.06) 
F_EMP -0.021 (-0.23) -0.197 (-1.29) 0.039 (0.51) 
C_EMP 0.151 (1.53) 0.697*** (4.23) -0.014 (-0.15) 
F_INC 0.316 (0.91) 1.009* (1.73) 0.107 (0.44) 
C_INC -0.375 (-0.75) -0.304 (-0.44) -0.099 (-0.27) 
F_GRP 0.059 (1.13) 0.151* (1.83) 0.014 (0.30) 
C_GRP -0.174** (-2.26) -0.391*** (-3.27) 0.054 (0.86) 
F_EDU -0.002 (-1.25) -0.002 (-0.77) 0.003** (2.07) 
C_EDU -0.005 (-1.62) -0.013** (-2.40) -0.002 (-0.63) 
F_FM -0.004 (-0.02) -0.924*** (-2.81) -0.531*** (-3.51) 
C_FM 0.065 (0.14) 0.297 (0.39) 1.024*** (2.62) 
F_DENSITY 0.182 (1.32) 0.409* (1.76) 0.097 (0.99) 
C_DENSITY -0.412** (-1.99) -0.648** (-2.17) -0.025 (-0.16) 
F_HOUSE_INC -0.403 (-1.14) -1.022* (-1.73) -0.120 (-0.49) 
C_HOUSE_INC 0.273 (0.55) 0.181 (0.26) 0.088 (0.25) 
       
COUNTY FE Yes  Yes  Yes  
YEAR FE Yes  Yes  Yes  





Table 3 (continued) 
Religiosity and VC Investment Characteristics 
Panel B. DENOMINATIONS 
 
(1) 








 Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat 
DENOMINATIONS 0.101*** (3.31) 0.203*** (4.08) 0.051** (2.17) 
VC_INDEPENDENT 0.053*** (4.98) 0.050** (2.48) -0.023** (-2.22) 
VC_AGE 0.090*** (6.74) 0.110*** (5.62) 0.052*** (5.02) 
C_IT 0.111*** (9.60) 0.300*** (16.53) 0.027*** (3.52) 
C_MEDICAL 0.248*** (18.65) 0.546*** (25.31) -0.070*** (-7.72) 
SEED_STAGE -0.311*** (-35.99) -0.519*** (-36.94)   
EARLY_STAGE -0.258*** (-46.90) -0.410*** (-47.93)   
DISTANCE 0.018*** (4.15) 0.040*** (5.90) 0.017*** (5.24) 
F_POP -0.039 (-0.69) 0.043 (0.40) -0.064 (-1.43) 
C_POP 0.104 (0.93) -0.331 (-1.61) 0.102 (1.04) 
F_POP_AGE 0.057 (0.46) 0.144 (0.67) 0.016 (0.16) 
C_POP_AGE -0.489* (-1.86) -2.088*** (-4.69) 0.043 (0.21) 
F_EMP -0.016 (-0.18) -0.187 (-1.13) 0.045 (0.60) 
C_EMP 0.121 (1.23) 0.695*** (4.03) -0.039 (-0.44) 
F_INC 0.134 (0.40) 0.666 (1.11) 0.005 (0.02) 
C_INC -0.359 (-0.72) -0.283 (-0.40) -0.089 (-0.25) 
F_GRP 0.062 (1.20) 0.157* (1.78) 0.013 (0.27) 
C_GRP -0.165** (-2.15) -0.424*** (-3.37) 0.062 (0.97) 
F_EDU -0.004** (-2.12) -0.005* (-1.79) 0.002 (1.52) 
C_EDU -0.004 (-1.16) -0.010* (-1.80) -0.001 (-0.20) 
F_FM 0.153 (0.81) -0.710** (-2.03) -0.445*** (-2.94) 
C_FM -0.031 (-0.07) 0.339 (0.42) 0.960** (2.45) 
F_DENSITY 0.115 (0.86) 0.276 (1.15) 0.066 (0.68) 
C_DENSITY -0.387* (-1.86) -0.640** (-2.05) -0.013 (-0.09) 
F_HOUSE_INC -0.191 (-0.56) -0.614 (-1.01) 0.001 (0.00) 
C_HOUSE_INC 0.236 (0.47) 0.161 (0.23) 0.064 (0.18) 
       
COUNTY FE Yes  Yes  Yes  
YEAR FE Yes  Yes  Yes  






Instrumental Variable Regressions 
This table presents instrumental variable (IV) regression analyses of religiosity and VC investment characteristics 
measuring risk taking. Panel A gives the results for number of rounds, panel B for number of investors, and panel 
C for later or expansion stage. The first stage regresses religiosity measures, i.e. (DENOMINATIONS_INT, 
ADHERENTS_INT), on the instrumental variable (lagged three-year religiosity measure and total population in 
panels A and C, and lagged three-year proportion of white population in a VC county (panel B). The results for 
the first-stage regression are available upon request. The second stage regresses VC investment characteristics 
measuring risk taking on the fitted value of religiosity measures from the first stage. All regressions include 
constant, deal, and company county characteristics, county and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered 
by VC firm. The sample includes all round-by-round VC investments in portfolio firms from 1980 through 2014. 
The sample size consists of 91,020 observations in panels A and B, and 90,569 in panel C. All variables are as 
defined in Appendix Table AI. ***, **, and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.  
 (1) (2) 






ADHERENTS_FITTED_VALUE 0.093**  
 (2.09)  
DENOMINATIONS_FITTED_VALUE  0. 100*** 
  (3.29) 
FIRST-STAGE F-STATISTICS P-VALUE 0.000 0.000 
SECOND-STAGE HANSEN J 0.313 1.451 
Panel B. Number of Investors   
ADHERENTS_FITTED_VALUE 0.169**  
 (2.31)  
DENOMINATIONS_FITTED_VALUE  0.195*** 
  (3.66) 
FIRST-STAGE F-STATISTICS P-VALUE 0.000 0.000 
SECOND-STAGE HANSEN J 0.473 0.927 
Panel C. Later and Expansion   
ADHERENTS_FITTED_VALUE 0.101*  
 (1.77)  
DENOMINATIONS_FITTED_VALUE  0.052** 
  (2.20) 
FIRST-STAGE F-STATISTICS P-VALUE 0.000 0.000 






Robustness – with VC Firm FEs 
This table presents OLS regression analyses of religiosity on number of rounds in column (1), number of investors in column (2), and on stage of company development in 
column (3). Panel A measures religiosity using ADHERENTS, and Panel B using DENOMINATIONS. All regressions include constant, deal, and company county 
characteristics, VC firm, and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by VC firm. The sample includes all round-by-round VC investments in portfolio firms from 1980 
through 2014. The sample size consists of 91,020 observations. All variables are as defined in Appendix Table AI. ***, **, and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, 
respectively.  
Panel A. ADHERENTS       
 
(1) 
NUMBER OF ROUNDS 
(2) 
NUMBER OF INVESTORS 
(3) 
LATER OR EXPANSION 
 Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat 
ADHERENTS 0.118 (1.19) 0.296* (1.67) 0.021 (0.24) 
       
CONTROLS  Yes  Yes  Yes  
VC FIRM FE Yes  Yes  Yes  
COUNTY FE Yes  Yes  Yes  
YEAR FE Yes  Yes  Yes  
R-SQ 0.314  0.331  0.114  
Panel B. DENOMINATIONS       
 
(1) 
NUMBER OF ROUNDS 
(2) 
NUMBER OF INVESTORS 
(3) 
LATER OR EXPANSION 
 Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat 
DENOMINATIONS 0.088* (1.69) 0.149* (1.77) 0.119*** (2.94) 
       
CONTROLS  Yes  Yes  Yes  
VC FIRM FE Yes  Yes  Yes  
COUNTY FE Yes  Yes  Yes  
YEAR FE Yes  Yes  Yes  





Portfolio Company Religiosity and VC Investment Characteristics – Falsification Test 
This table presents OLS regression analyses of religiosity on number of rounds in column (1), number of investors 
in column (2), and stage of company development in column (3). Panel A measures portfolio company religiosity 
using ADHERENTS, and Panel B using DENOMINATIONS. All regressions include constant, deal, and company 
county characteristics and year and VC firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by VC firm. The sample 
includes all round-by-round VC investments in portfolio firms from 1980 through 2014. The sample size consists 
of 91,020 observations. All variables are as defined in Appendix Table AI. ***, **, and * denote 1%, 5%, and 
10% significance levels, respectively.  
Panel A. PORTFOLIO COMPANY ADHERENTS 
 
(1) 












-0.057 (-0.76) -0.001 (-1.60) -0.019 (-0.33) 
       
CONTROLS Yes  Yes  Yes  
VC FIRM FE Yes  Yes  Yes  
YEAR FE Yes  Yes  Yes  
R-SQ 0.331  0.385  0.152  
 
Panel B. PORTFOLIO COMPANY DENOMINATIONS 
 
(1) 












-0.068 (-1.33) -0.056 (-0.69) -0.006 (-0.17) 
       
CONTROLS Yes  Yes  Yes  
VC FIRM FE Yes  Yes  Yes  
YEAR FE Yes  Yes  Yes  
R-SQ 0.331  0.389  0.152  
 
Panel C. SAME COUNTY 
 
(1) 








 Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat 
SAME COUNTY 0.015 (0.30) -0.036 (-0.41) 0.033 (0.96) 
       
CONTROLS Yes  Yes  Yes  
VC FIRM FE Yes  Yes  Yes  
YEAR FE Yes  Yes  Yes  
R-SQ 0.331  0.389  0.152  
 
